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ABSTRACT 
Tigers are a threatened species that might soon disappear in the wild. Not only are tigers 
threatened by deteriorating and declining habitat, but poachers continue to kill tigers for 
traditional medicine, decoration pieces and so on. Although international trade in tiger products 
has been banned since 1987 and domestic trade within China since 1993, tigers continue to be 
poached and Chinese entrepreneurs have established tiger farms in anticipation of their demise. 
While China desires to permit sale of tiger products from captive-bred tigers, this is opposed on 
the grounds that it likely encourages illegal killing. Instead, wildlife conservationists lobby for 
more spending on anti-poaching and trade-ban enforcement. In this study, a mathematical 
bioeconomic model is used to investigate the issue. Simulation results indicate that, unless 
range states are characterized by institutions (rule of law, low corruption) similar to those found 
in the richest countries, reliance on enforcement alone is insufficient to guarantee survival of 
wild tigers. Likewise, even though conservation payments could protect wild tigers, the 
inability to enforce contracts militates against this. Our model indicates that wild tigers can be 
protected by permitting sale of products from tiger farms, although this likely requires the 
granting of an exclusive license to sellers. Finally, it is possible to tradeoff enforcement effort 
and sale of products from captive-bred animals, but such tradeoffs are worsened by 
deteriorating tiger habitat.  
 
Keywords:   endangered species and extinction; wildlife farming; economics of natural; 
mathematical bioeconomics 
JEL Categories: Q27, C61, Q57 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Wild tiger populations have declined from some 100,000 in 1900 to perhaps as few as 
3500 today. The Bali tiger became extinct during the 1930s, the Caspian tiger during the 1970s, 
and the Javan tiger disappeared a decade later. Six species of tiger (Bengal, Indo-Chinese, 
Siberian, South China, Malaysian and Sumatran) remain, scattered throughout eastern Russia, 
North Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar 
(Burma), Bhutan, India and Nepal.
1
In an effort to stave off extinction, international trade in tigers has been prohibited since 
1975 when the species was listed on Appendix I of the UN Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES), with the exception of the Siberian sub-species which was listed in 
1987. As a result of international pressure, China imposed a domestic ban on trade in tiger bones 
and medicine made with tiger bone in 1993, with purveyors of traditional Chinese medicine 
adapting by providing a range of alternative products. Evidence indicates that illegal trade in 
wild tigers continues, however, with tiger bone still used in some traditional medicines.
  Poaching, depletion of prey and habitat destruction 
(including illegal logging) are major contributing factors to the demise of the tiger.  
2 Within 
China, the domestic ban led to the establishment of tiger farms that now house some 5000 
animals (CATT, 2007; Gratwicke et al., 2008).
3
                                                 
1 Information available from http://www.tigersincrisis.com/ as viewed 30 June 2008. 
2 Bhalla (2006) points out that some 300,000 of India's poorest people currently live in 28 tiger 
reserves, surviving on a variety of forest products including payments from criminal gangs to 
trap and kill tigers “to meet increasing demand from neighboring China, where skins have 
become status symbols in Tibet and body parts are used in traditional medicines.”  
3 Nowell and Ling (2007) estimate that there are more than 4000 captive tigers in China, while 
CITES (1999) estimates that about 200 kittens are born in captivity every year. 
 Wildlife groups are concerned that the sale of 
products from tiger farms (an inevitable outcome should that many tigers remain in captivity in 
China) will increase demand for tigers and facilitate the marketing of poached tigers.    2 
The government of China has considered partially lifting its domestic ban on trade in 
tiger products to allow products from captive breeding farms to be sold legally. The carcasses of 
tigers that have died in captivity are currently frozen and stored as owners speculate that the 
domestic trade ban will be relaxed, although there is concern that tiger farms are already a source 
of illegally traded products that contain tiger bone (Novell and Ling, 2007; EIA, 2007). 
Opponents to the sale of captive tigers argue that any weakening of the trade ban will legitimize 
consumption of tiger products and increase the demand for tiger parts; this, in turn, will increase 
poaching because detection of products from poached tigers would be more difficult.
4
The most common  recommendation  for preventing extirpation of wild tigers is to 
increase enforcement of the international and Chinese trade bans, while opposing tiger farming 
on the grounds that farmed output  removes the stigma of using tiger-based products and 
facilitates the laundering of illegal tiger parts. Proponents of tiger farming and trade in tiger 
parts, on the other hand, favor a supply-side approach to conservation, arguing that a captive 
breeding industry could meet all demand for tiger products, thereby eliminating illegal killing of 
 
Researchers have surveyed tiger populations and the extent of their habitat, the availability of 
tiger products in Chinese and international markets, the state of captive tiger breeding in China, 
and confiscations of poached tigers, and concluded that wild tigers will likely become extinct if 
the status quo is maintained (Gratwicke et al., 2008; Nowell and Ling, 2007; Dinerstein et al., 
2006; Shepherd and Magnus, 2004; Bolze et al., 1998).  
                                                 
4 For example, Gratwicke et al (2008) write: “Re-igniting demand for tiger parts and products 
among China’s 1.4 billion consumers would increase poaching of wild tigers because the 
demand for wild tiger parts would not be satisfied by … farmed tigers for two reasons; 1) 
medicines made from wild tigers are believed to be more effective …, and 2) the demand for 
tiger products cannot be met from farms alone. Furthermore, a legal market of any kind would 
allow laundering of poached tiger products that would be virtually undetectable.”   3 
wild tigers and preventing their extinction.
5
Similar arguments have been raised concerning the African elephant and the ivory trade 
ban. There is fear that CITES-sanctioned ‘one-off’ sales of ivory will promote illegal killing of 
elephants. Given the extent and scope of poaching, van Kooten (2008) found that the elephant 
could go extinct in some African states despite a trade ban and high levels of enforcement. The 
so-called ‘stigma effect’  (Fischer, 2004), which has not been demonstrated empirically but 
postulates that the demand for illegal elephant products falls when trade is banned, had little 
effect in reducing the rate of decline in elephant populations in west and central Africa.
 Upon examining the issue in a theoretical frame-
work, Damania and Bulte (2007) demonstrate that multiple equilibriums are possible in a game 
between poachers, organized purveyors of illegal wildlife products and wildlife farms. Thus, it is 
not possible to determine unambiguously whether products from captive-bred wildlife will 
increase or decrease harvests of wild animals. They also argue that, since the feed costs of raising 
tigers are considerable, farmers are unable to undercut suppliers of illegal wildlife products. 
However, they assume very low costs of bringing poached wildlife to a comparable stage in the 
processing chain and ignore the potential economies of scale in producing multiple products 
from tigers that are not available when activities must be hidden from the authorities.  
6
                                                 
5 Proponents also argue that farmed tigers constitute a reserve that can be used to restock areas 
where tigers have disappeared, much as wolves from Canada were successfully used to restock 
Yellowstone National Park in the 1990s. 
6 The latest African Elephant Status Report (Blanc et al., 2007) found that elephant numbers in 
east and southern Africa are increasing by 4% annually. Although the 1999 sale of raw ivory 
stockpiled by southern states seems to have had no impact on elephant numbers (Bulte, Damania 
and van Kooten, 2007), it will take some time before the impact of the larger auction of ivory in 
Fall 2008 is known.  
 Van 
Kooten also demonstrated that the elephant is best protected by effectively linking their non-
market value to actual on-the-ground payments to those best able to protect them.    4 
The present study contributes to the debate about tiger farming by using evidence from 
past studies to calibrate a mathematical bioeconomic model of wild tiger population dynamics 
and trade, using it to analyze the potential for heightened anti-poaching enforcement and/or 
liberalization of the captive tiger breeding industry for preventing the extinction of wild tigers. A 
major conclusion of our research is that anti-poaching  and trade-ban enforcement must be 
increased to a rate that is seemingly unattainable if extirpation is to be prevented, but that a 
captive breeding industry and/or effective transfer payments from rich countries to poor ones for 
protecting wild tigers could potentially prevent the extirpation of wild tigers. 
The fate of the wild tiger population is modeled by a tiger survivability function that is 
derived from economic principles. The survivability function is a differential equation that maps 
the tiger population, the rate of poacher detection, the output of tiger farms, the stigma effect, the 
amount of habitat available, and other relevant variables to the rate of change in the wild tiger 
population. Using the survivability function, we can determine for any combination of 
parameters whether the tiger population will reach a stable positive equilibrium or go extinct. We 
estimate the current levels of all of the parameters and then determine how much each must 
change, ceteris paribus, to prevent wild tigers from becoming extinct. 
We begin in the next section by constructing a mathematical bioeconomic model of tiger 
poaching and trade that includes possibilities of sale of tiger products from captive-bred animals. 
In section 3, we use the model to focus on the role of anti-poaching, trade-ban enforcement and 
potential sale of farmed tigers, extending this to a consideration of habitat and conservation 
payments (non-market considerations) in section 4. We conclude in section 5 with a discussion 
of the policy issues raised by the modeling exercise.   5 
2. BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF TIGER EXPLOITATION 
An economic model of the interplay between killing of wild tigers and culling of farmed 
animals is provided in Figure 1. When there is no ban on farmed tigers, equilibrium occurs at 
point z, with the number of wild plus farmed tigers harvested equal to q
* and corresponding price 
of p
*; q1 wild tigers are poached and q
*–q1 (=q
legal) farm-produced tigers are killed. When there 
is a ban on products from Chinese tiger farms, the demand curve shifts inwards as indicated – it 
is assumed for simplicity that the slope of the demand function remains constant while the 
intercept shifts from k to s to account for the stigma effect. With a Chinese trade ban and demand 
function DStigma, the market equilibrium shifts from z to w, with price p
** and illegal quantity 
equal to q
**. This assumes that the illegal supply function is upward sloping; however, Nowell 
and Ling (2007) indicate that there has been little change in tiger bone prices from the early 
1990s to 2006. If price has indeed remained constant since the Chinese trade ban came into 
effect in 1993, then either DStigma has shifted further to the left than indicated in Figure 1 (so it 
intersects the horizontal price line p
* at v rather than y) or the illegal supply curve is horizontal 
(S′illegal), indicating constant marginal costs of poaching and marketing tigers. The only time that 
the trade ban will stop all illegal harvests is if, in Figure 1, the illegal supply function is upward 
sloping and its intercept lies above p
* (perhaps due to very successful enforcement). If not, then 
tigers will always be poached. The question is whether illegal harvests will still cause extirpation 








































Figure 1: Tiger Market 
Bioeconomic Model 
The forgoing model neglects the dynamics of tiger reproduction, habitat loss and so on. A 
bioeconomic analysis begins by supposing that the population of wild tigers x is characterized by 
the following single-species growth function with Allee effect:  





















where m is the minimum viable population, K is the population carrying capacity and γ is a 
growth constant (see Boukal and Berec, 2002). The rate at which tigers are harvested is given by 
a constant returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(2)  h(x, τ) = θ x
½ τ
½ ,   7 
where θ is a catchability or scale parameter and τ  is the fraction of time spent poaching.  
If the potential penalties poachers face if caught are independent of how much they 
poach, an expected utility maximizing poacher will choose τ so that 
(3)  ½ θ x 
½ τ 
–½
where the parameter π is the probability of apprehension, p is the market price of a tiger, and w is 
the wage rate in other employment. Solving (3) for τ and substituting the result into equation (2) 
gives:  
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Tiger Survivability Function 
The tiger survivability function is the solution to the differential equation: 
(6)  x
dt






















If demand is perfectly elastic so that p is fixed, the survival function can easily be parameterized. 
If demand is not perfectly elastic then price is a function of output and we replace x with p(x). As 
discussed below, the case where output from tiger farms affects the price of tigers is the one of 
most interest. If this is not the case, then tiger farming has no effect on wild tigers and 
policymakers need to think of strategies to save wild tigers that are independent of decisions   8 
regarding the legitimacy of tiger farms.  
The illegal supply of tigers is given by (1 – π) h, or 





2 2 π θ −
. 
We assume a linear derived demand function for wild tigers, D(p)= α + β p, with α≥0 and β<0. 
Setting S(p)=D(p) and solving for price gives: 
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Tiger Survival Parameterization 
As indicated in Figure 1, projections regarding the survivability of wild tigers depend on 
the parameters chosen for the model. Without adequate data for regression analyses, the 
bioeconomic model is parameterized using the little data that are available from various sources. 
Nowell and Ling (2007) report that, in 1992, some 200 wild tigers were harvested with a total 
industry value of $US 12.4 million, or $62,000 per tiger. There is evidence that poachers 
working in the forest only receive about $800 per tiger, but that those with organized crime 
gangs receive considerably more (CITES, 2009).
7
Each tiger produces approximately 10 kg of bone; thus, 200 wild tigers would yield 2000 
kg of bone. Over the period 1999-2005, an average of 60 kg of tiger bone was seized annually, or 
3% of the 1992 illegal harvest, which represents a detection rate of π = 0.03. If more wild tigers 
 We choose a price of $20,000 per wild tiger, 
but consider scenarios with lower and higher prices.  
                                                 
7 An article in The Times of India (June 9, 2008), entitled “Vietnam police arrest tiger smuggler”, 
reports that a man was arrested for smuggling a 190-kg tiger carcass from Laos into Vietnam. He 
had paid $20,000 for the tiger with the intention of using it to make traditional medicines.    9 
had been harvested, the detection rate would be lower. Given that there were perhaps 5000 wild 
tigers in 1992, of which 200 were harvested, the rate of poaching is about 4.5%. However, tigers 
are also lost due to declining habitat and depletion of prey by encroaching peasants.  
Based on an historic tiger population of 100,000 and loss of 93% of historical habitat, the 
carrying capacity of the wild tiger population is estimated to be 7000. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the current wild tiger population of 3500 is lower than the estimated 5000 to 7000 
that existed in the early 1980s (CITES, 1999, 2001; BBC, 2008). The current range of the wild 
tiger is estimated to be 40% less than it was in the mid 1990s (Dinerstein et al., 2006), an annual 
loss of some 3.4%. We assume that, as a result of habitat loss and prey depredation, that carrying 
capacity declined from some 19,000 to 10,000 tigers in the 15 years prior to the Chinese trade 
ban, and then declined further from 10,000 to 7000 in the period following 1993. This 
corresponds to an assumed decline in wild tiger stocks from 10,000 to 5000 animals in the pre-
ban period and a further decline to 3500 animals in the period after 1993. Lacking evidence 
concerning the minimum viable population of wild tigers, we conjecture that because habitat is 
fragmented it is at least 1000.  
To determine the growth constant γ, we need an estimate of the growth rate of a wild tiger 
population that is not subject to poaching. Karanath et al. (2006) measure a growth rate of 3% for 
a population in a protected area in India. The natural population growth rate g(x) is set equal to 

















Given x=3500, m=1000 and K=7000, the growth constant is γ = 0.108. 
The annual wage rate, w, is assumed to be $US 450, based on an exchange rate of 0.18   10 
$US/CNY reported in IMF financial statistics, and a per capita GDP of 2711 CNY reported by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  
It remains to determine the demand function and the stigma effect. Assume the following 
linear demand function for wild tigers at the place they are poached: 
(10)  q = α + β p, 
where α and β are the intercept and slope parameters, respectively, and q refers to the number of 
tigers that are ‘consumed’. The effect of the trade ban, or stigma effect, enters the model through 
a reduction in the demand intercept α from k to s in Figure 1 – a downward shift in demand. Prior 
to 1993, there was no stigma effect. To determine the values of the pre-ban and post-ban demand 
intercept terms, αno stigma and αstigma respectively, we employ a constrained optimization model 
that is solved separately for each of the pre- and post-trade ban periods. In doing this, we assume 
values of q, p, w, initial x, and π =0.03. The results are provided in Table 1, where the value of θ 
calculated from equation (5) is also provided.  
The tiger survivability function can be viewed graphically by plotting dx/dt  on the 
vertical axis against x(t) on the horizontal axis. For any x(t) for which dx/dt  > 0,  the tiger 
population is growing, while it shrinks whenever dx/dt < 0. If dx/dt < 0 for all x ≤ x(t) then the 
tiger will become extinct. This is the case in Figure 2 for parameters associated with four of the 
scenarios in Table 1. Our model supports the conclusions of tiger researchers as it predicts 
extinction of the wild tiger, even under a Chinese trade ban, and this result is robust to a large 
number of scenarios. The remainder of this analysis is largely concerned with how policies might 
prevent extinction.   11 
Table 1: Parameterization of the Demand Functions, w=$450, π =0.03 
  Carrying Capacity  Wild Tiger Stocks     
Item  Beginning  Ending  Beginning  Ending     
Pre-1993  19,090  11,560  10,000  5,000     
Post-1993  11,560  7000  5000  3500     
    Price =$2000       Price =$20,000    
 
   Price =$31,000    




a  200  450  200  450  200 
θ
2(x0∈{5000
,  10,000}) 0.0208763  a  0.0185567  0.0020876  0.0018557  0.0013469  0.0011972 
α(β=–0.005) 826 
b  396  1041  589  1173  708 
α(β=–0.01) 850 
b  417  1281  806  1548  1045 
α(β=–0.02)  
b    1767  1241     
θ
2 (x0=3500) 0.02650957 
c  0.002650957  0.0017103 
Notes: 
a Assumed harvests in the pre-1993 (free trade) and post-1993 (trade ban) periods that are used to 
calculate θ via equation (5), with respective beginning wild tiger populations employed for x. 
b The free trade and trade ban values of α are the ‘no stigma’ and ‘stigma’ values of the demand 
intercepts, k and s respectively in Figure 1.  
c 




















This value of θ is used in the sensitivity analyses along with the given parameters of the ‘no 




Figure 2: Tiger Survivability for Various Population Levels, with Trade Ban, Wild Tiger θ 
Determined from Assumed Prices of $2000 and $20,000, x0=3500   12 
3. PREVENTING EXTIRPATION BY FOCUSING ON POACHING 
  To prevent tigers from becoming extinct, policies need to be enacted to reduce the 
prevalence of poaching. Tigers are fairly susceptible to modest increases in mortality, and less 
likely to recover quickly after population declines (Chapron et al., 2008). Since the current tiger 
population is above the hypothesized minimum viable population, policy can affect the 
parameters of the tiger survivability function in such a way that it becomes positive at x(t) = 
3500. An example of a parameter that can be changed is the rate of poacher detection, π. If the 
rate at which poachers are caught increases sufficiently, it will become far less profitable for 
poachers to harvest tigers, and poaching pressure will be reduced to a level at which the 
survivability function is positive.  
A second policy option is to introduce farmed tiger products to the market. The presence 
of captivity-bred tigers would increase the total supply of tiger products, reducing the price of 
those products and making poaching a less profitable occupation. If the price is reduced enough, 
the tiger survivability function will become positive and extinction will be prevented. However, 
by introducing farmed tigers to the market, the stigma effect associated with the prohibition of 
tiger trade will disappear, which will tend to increase poaching. 
Finally, we are interested in combinations of policy options that can prevent extinction. 
For example, we may want to know whether a particular combination of enhanced enforcement 
and farmed products can prevent extinction. There are many possible minimum combinations of 
the two policies that can prevent extinction, and these combinations can be used to determine 
what we will describe as a policy frontier.  
How Much Enforcement? 
Increased expenditures on enforcement will result in higher rates of poacher detection.   13 
Here we determine by how much detection probabilities might have to increase given that the 
likely status quo in our model is extinction (Figure 2). Results are provided in Figure 3 for 
different rates of detection under the base case scenario where θ is determined using a price of 
$20,000 per wild tiger. To prevent extirpation of wild tigers, anti-poaching and trade-ban 
enforcement must be substantially enhanced, with the increase required highly dependent on 
whether or not there is a stigma effect.
8
                                                 
8 Recall that there is no statistical support for the existence of a stigma effect, although research 
such as that reported by Gratwicke et al. (2008) certainly hints at it. 
 If a ban on tigers does not lead to a stigma effect, the rate 
of detection must exceed 75%. Even if there is a stigma effect, the rate of detection must rise to 
above 65% from the current rate of 3%. The stigma effect causes the required rate of detection to 
forgo extirpation to fall from 76% to 65% in the base case if β = –0.02, to fall from 84% to 73% 
if β = –0.01, and from 91% to 82% if β = –0.005. If the value of θ is based on a price for wild 
tigers of $2000, then required detection rates must always exceed 90% and a trade ban has only a 
small effect on lowering the level of detection that is needed to arrest extinction. If price is 
$31,000, the required detection rate is 79% (86%) for β = –0.01 (β = –0.005), falling to 68% 
(76%) with a stigma effect. For range states to attain these levels of detection appears 
particularly daunting. We return to the enforcement issue in the policy recommendations below. 
    14 















































(a) β = –0.010, αno stigma=1281, αstigma

















































(b) β = –0.005, αno stigma=1041, αstigma
Figure 3: Impact of Detection Rate on Survival of Wild Tigers, Base Case Price Scenario 
=589 
We are also interested in how quickly the tiger population will grow and what the 
population projections might be if an increased enforcement policy that prevents extinction is 
acted upon. Historical records of the dynamics of the Amur tiger (P. t. altaica) population in 
Russia  show that  recovery of this population from an estimated low of 20-30 individuals 
(Kaplanov,  1948) to an estimated 415-476 adults in 1996 (Miquelle et al.,  2007) depended 
largely on the outlawing of hunting and strict controls on poaching, and required about 40 years.   15 
Our results are provided in Table 2. They suggest that, assuming habitat and other factors permit, 
the population of wild tigers could increase from 3500 to over 4000 if adequate enforcement of 
trade and poaching bans results in detection probabilities of 75% or more, and there is a real 
stigma effect associated with the ban on products from Chinese tiger farms. If there were no 
stigma effect, then a much higher level of enforcement success would be required. Finally, if rich 
country institutions were available in all of the tiger states so that detection rates are nearer 95%, 
it might be possible to increase populations to some 6000 animals in the long run for all 
scenarios. 
Table 2: Projected Tiger Populations after 20 and 100 Years with Varying Levels of 






Population without stigma effect    Population with stigma effect 
Mid: θ
2 High: θ  = 0.00265 
2    = 0.00171  Mid: θ
2 High: θ  = 0.00265 
2 = 0.00171 
20 yrs  100 yrs  20 yrs  100 yrs    20 yrs  100 yrs  20 yrs  100 yrs 
0.40  863  0  1340  0    2182  0  2429  0 
0.45  1009  0  1517  0    2317  0  2582  2 
0.50  1185  0  1719  0    2473  0  2751  15 
0.55  1396  0  1948  0    2651  4  2938  234 
0.60  1645  0  2207  0    2855  61  3144  1551 
0.65  1938  0  2499  2    3084  1063  3370  2952 
0.70  2281  0  2824  77    3342  2808  3617  3890 
0.75  2677  11  3185  1956    3631  3934  3884  4571 
0.80  3131  1595  3582  3774    3950  4713  4172  5132 
0.85  3643  3951  4015  4829    4300  5350  4481  5634 
0.90  4214  5195  4484  5634    4679  5926  4808  6106 
0.95  4839  6147  4984  6341    5084  6472  5153  6559 
Note: 
a
How Much Farmed Product? 
 Price scenarios are determined by the values of θ; the ‘mid’ (base case) scenario is associated 
with a price of $20,000 per tiger, the ‘high’ scenario with a price of $31,000 (see Table 1). 
 
If tigers are farmed, there will be some number Ω produced by the farms. The supply of 
tigers will differ from equation (7) because legal sales will need to be added to the illegal supply:   16 





2 π θ −
 + Ω. 
Although poaching remains illegal, Chinese domestic trade using bred captive tigers is now 
taken to be legal so that the stigma effect no longer holds. As a result, the demand intercept (α) 
increases from what it is with a stigma effect back to what is was prior to the trade ban (see 
Table 1). The results are provided in Figure 4.  













































Figure 4: Legalizing Tiger Farming to Prevent Extinction, Loss of Stigma Effect, x0=3500 
Extinction of wild tigers is avoided when the number of farmed animals sold into the 
market reaches about 600 or more annually, which is where the change in population becomes 
positive. Ten years ago the annual number of tigers born in captivity was about 200 (CITES, 
1999), but is probably significantly higher today. Given that annual production is likely nearing 
that which will prevent wild tigers from being extirpated, it seems reasonable to permit sales of 
farmed tigers for traditional medicines and other uses. This is discussed further in the policy 
recommendations below.   17 
In Table 3, we present wild tiger population growth projections for various levels of tiger 
farm production (Ω). These indicate that wild tiger populations will come under less pressure and 
expand in numbers (at least within the parameters of our model) as the output from tiger farms 
increases from 650 to 850 or more bred animals per year. However, if less that about 650 farmed 
tigers are permitted into the market each year, the population of wild tigers will continue to 
decline, primarily because demand is shifted out because there is no stigma effect.  
Table 3: Projected Tiger Populations after 20 and 100 Years with Various Marketing of 







2    = 0.02651  β = –0.005 
β = –0.01  β = –0.005    Mid: θ
2 High: θ  = 0.00265 
2 = 0.00171 
20 yrs  100 yrs  20 yrs  100 yrs    20 yrs  100 yrs  20 yrs  100 yrs 
600  3236  0  3370  730    2569  0  2335  0 
650  3750  4906  3905  5321    2921  0  2611  0 
700  4233  5801  4403  6020    3274  739  2892  0 
750  4686  6293  4866  6468    3623  4220  3177  270 
800  5111  6673  5297  6830    3967  5225  3463  3238 
850  5510  6997  5699  7144    4304  5766  3748  4602 
900  5884  7287  6074  7426    4633  6162  4031  5269 
950  6235  7551  6425  7684    4953  6492  4312  5718 
Note: 
a
Combining Policy Instruments 
 Scenarios are determined by the values of β and θ; the ‘low’ scenario is associated with a price 
of $2000 per tiger, the ‘mid’ (base case) scenario with a price of $20,000, and the ‘high’ scenario 
with a price of $31,000 (see Table 1). 
We now compute minimum policy combinations that are required to prevent extinction. 
We do this heuristically by fixing an enforcement level and then calculating what the production 
of tiger farms would have to be to prevent extirpation of wild tigers. The simulated policy 
combinations are plotted in Figure 5 to form the extinction prevention policy frontier. It indicates 
that if π = 0.05, for example, then tigers will go extinct in the absence of tiger farming; at the 
other extreme, an enforcement effort leading to an unrealistic detection rate of more than 80% is 
required to prevent extinction if no tiger farming is permitted.    18 
The policy frontier enables us to ask how many fewer captive tigers could be sold if 
enforcement is increased and extinction of wild tigers is to be prevented. If the rate of detection 
is increased from the current π = 0.03 to π = 0.15, something like five fewer tigers (about 865 
rather than 870) could be sold annually to prevent extinction, but only for the β = –0.01 scenario 
and not the β = –0.005 scenario (it would require that the detection rate reach 40%). However, if 
the rate of detection were already π = 0.50 and we could raise it to π = 0.65, some 170 fewer 
captivity-bred tigers would need to be sold annually to prevent extinction of wild tigers in the β = 
–0.01 scenario, and nearly 80 tigers in the β = –0.005 scenario.  


































Figure 5: Extinction Prevention Policy Frontier, Base Case Scenario 
4. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: HABITAT AND CONSERVATION PAYMENTS 
Along with other factors such as the quality of the ecosystem and quantity of prey, the 
available habitat determines the maximum number of tigers that can survive in the wild – the 
ecosystem’s carrying capacity. Even the minimum viable population required to ensure that 
tigers do not go extinct might be affected by the amount of habitat available to tigers. Clearly, 
quantity and quality of tiger habitat has declined during the 20
th century (Dinerstein et al., 2006).    19 
India has taken steps to protect tigers, for example, by setting aside habitat. It protects 
some 37,000 km
2 of habitat in 27 tiger reserves, although more than 20,000 km
2 of this is 
included in buffer zones and not actual reserves.
9 It is not clear how many tigers are protected as 
population counts are sporadic and reliant on the discredited use of pugmarks.
10
The Effect of Tiger Habitat 
 Available data 
indicate that the highest total animal count occurred in 1997, but it found less than 1100 animals, 
while a failure to find any tigers in the Sariska Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan State in 2005 created 
quite a stir (Sudir, 2006). With 40 million people now living in India’s forested areas, it is little 
wonder that tigers are disappearing despite efforts since 1973 to protect their habitat – protecting 
habitat is insufficient if its quality is seriously eroded by the activities of peasants, including 
illegal logging and taking of wildlife upon which tigers prey.  
In China, tiger habitat quality and quantity have also declined as the rural (primarily 
agricultural) population has grown and a larger proportion of total available land is used in 
agriculture. However, the population engaged in agriculture has not increased since about 1990, 
while the decline in woodland area has also been arrested (FAO, 2008). Nonetheless, until very 
recently, the proportion of land in agriculture continued to increase, although it has now 
stabilized at about 60% of total land. This slowdown in the growth of agricultural land could 
simply be due to scarcity of suitable land (FAO, 2008; Fischer et al., 1999). Clearly, in China 
land suitable for tigers has declined significantly since at least 1960.  
Given that the simulations reported earlier did not directly address the issue of habitat 
loss (only taking it into account in determining the potential size of the stigma effect), we 
                                                 
9 Available at http://www.wpsi-india.org/tiger/tiger_reserves.php (as viewed July 3, 2008). 
10 Pugmarks are paw prints thought to be unique to each tiger. A better method not currently 
employed is to use fecal samples to extract DNA and identify individual tigers (Sudhir, 2006).   20 
simulate the impact that further habitat degradation will have on the policies necessary to prevent 
extinction of wild tigers. This is done by varying the carrying capacity in the simulations from 
K=7000 to K=6300 and K=5600, representing approximate habitat losses of 10% and 20%, 
respectively. The simulation results are provided in Figures 6a and 6b for the base case scenario, 
with β = –0.01 and β = –0.005, respectively. These indicate that substantial policy adjustments 
are required – the level of enforcement must be increased so that the detection rate rises from 
some 74% to slightly more than 80% in one scenario (Figure 6a), and from nearly 80% to more 
than 85% in another (Figure 6b), when respective habitat losses of 10% and 20% are 
experienced. Alternatively, the number of captivity-bred tigers marketed annually could be 
increased by some 200 (β= –0.005) to 240 animals (β= –0.01) as indicated by the policy frontier 
in Figure 5.  
Conservation Payments and Tiger Poaching 
It is theoretically possible that poachers and consumers of tiger products are compensated 
so as not to undertake these activities. It is theoretical only because, lacking many essential 
governance institutions (e.g., rule of law), it is likely impossible to enforce contracts with tiger 
poachers and consumers in much of Asia. Alternatively, rather than compensating poachers and 
consumers of tiger products, it might be possible to protect wild tigers by compensating resource 
(habitat) owners and others who might be negatively impacted by tigers or have the incentive to 
poach or help poachers (perhaps only by not reporting their activities). Here we seek to answer 
the question of how much compensation might be required to prevent extirpation of wild tigers 
in roundabout fashion by considering the levels of compensation needed by poachers and 
consumers of tiger products. 
   21 











































(a) β = –0.010, αstigma












































(b) β = –0.005, αstigma
Figure 6: Impact of Reduced Habitat on Detection Rate Needed for Survival of Wild Tigers 
















= .   22 
The total consumer plus producer surplus (SS) in the tiger market is then given by: 




















Let  q <q* be the number of tigers that would prevent extinction of tigers, that is, the level that 
just causes dx/dt>0. A transfer or conservation payment of amount M is required to protect 
q q − *  tigers. Therefore, we define the marginal surplus value, M, as the surplus created by the 
last  q q − *  tigers consumed (see Figure 7): 
(15)   M = ) * ( ) * (









































The number of tigers that could theoretically be saved per year if side payments were possible is 
) 1 /( ) * ( π − −q q . The divisor (1–π) accounts for the fact that tigers are no longer confiscated from 
poachers because poaching is assumed to cease when conservation payments are made. 
From (15), we can solve for q  as a function of M and the solution will be quadratic with 
two real roots. One of the roots will be less than q* and the other greater than q*; we select the 
smaller value of q*. We can simulate the effect of conservation (side) payments on the tiger 
survivability function by writing the tiger growth function as:  
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Equation (16) is similar to equation (6) but with an added term that is positive because (q*–q )>0 
and (1–π)>0. Mathematically, dx/dt will be greater for all levels of x, which implies that there is 
greater incentive to preserve tigers. Using (16),  we can determine how large M  must be to 
prevent extinction – that is, the size of the conservation payment required to make dx/dt positive 
somewhere in the interval [0, x(0)]. The results are provided in Figure 8.  
Results indicate that, if a trade ban is in place (and thus a stigma effect), the minimum 
required conservation payments are $7.7 to $22.0 million for β = –0.01, depending on the price 
scenario used to determine θ, with the lower compensation level associated with the lower price 
for  poached  wild  tigers.  The  comparable  conservation  payments  required  if  β  =  –0.005 are 
between $14.5 and $28.5 million per year. If there is no trade ban (no stigma effect), annual 
conservation payments would have to increase to $52-$66 million for the β = –0.005 scenarios, 
and $105-$115 million for the β = –0.01 scenarios. Even the latter are relatively small amounts   24 
for protecting wild tigers. That is, the compensation required in our model to ensure that 
poaching of wild tigers will not lead to their extirpation does not constitute an obstacle to the 
conservation of tigers.  
 

















































Figure 8: Conservation Payments (M) and Potential to Prevent Extirpation of Tigers, Base Case 
Price Scenario 
In reaching this conclusion, we focused only on the size of payments required to offset 
the benefits to consumers and producers of wild tiger products. We neglect the issue of habitat 
and the value of habitat in other uses. However, to the extent that countries such as India and 
China have set aside land as wildlife (tiger) reserves, the problem of habitat conversion should be 
less an issue than that of poaching. Nonetheless, even if conservation payments were to increase 
by an order of magnitude, they would not constitute an onerous obstacle to tiger preservation. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Given the complexity of tiger protection, our results suggest that, because habitat is being 
eroded, neither legitimizing trade in products from captive bred tigers nor increased enforcement   25 
are likely able to prevent the tiger from going extinct in the wild. Rather, a cocktail of policies 
will be needed to give wild tigers a chance of surviving. Clearly, if governance institutions found 
in developed countries (rule of law, low levels of corruption, etc.) also characterized range states, 
the tiger would survive in the wild (see Bulte et al., 2003). These kinds of institutions lead to 
rates of detection that exceed those required to preserve wild tigers. Our results also indicate that 
conservation payments from rich countries to poor range states can be effective in protecting 
tigers, as was shown to be the case for elephants (van Kooten, 2008), and that such payments 
need not be onerous. But again, lack of adequate institutions precludes the ability to write 
enforceable contracts that protect habitat and prevent poaching of tigers. 
In the absence of the required institutions or effective community-based natural resource 
management regimes that inhibit illegal takings, our results indicate that the sale of tiger 
products from tiger farms in China might reduce poaching sufficiently to enable wild tigers to 
reproduce faster than they are killed. Some combination of increased enforcement and sale of 
products from captive-bred animals might also work. However, the loss of quality habitat makes 
it even more difficult to design an effective policy for saving wild tigers.  
Our simulation results assume that anti-poaching enforcement efforts and the demand for 
poached tigers will be unaffected if tiger farming is legitimized, other than through a stigma 
effect that causes demand to shift outwards if trade is permitted. These assumptions are certain to 
generate debate, as there are several arguments against them. Most commentators have argued 
against legalization of tiger farming on the following grounds (CITES, 2001; Nowell and Ling, 
2007): 
1.  Legalization will increase the demand for poached tigers because farmers will purchase 
them to increase their captive stocks.   26 
2.  Legalization will increase poaching because it is much cheaper to poach a tiger than to 
raise one in captivity; thus, producers of tiger products will purchase poached animals 
and sell them as if they were bred in captivity. This is one means by which a legalized 
activity facilitates an illegal one. 
3.  Because there will be a legitimate supply of tigers as well as an illegal supply, it will be 
harder to recognize poached tigers and the effectiveness of anti-poaching efforts will be 
reduced. 
These claims would certainly be warranted if the legal sector (tiger farming) was unregulated 
with many competitive firms. However, if tiger farming is concentrated in a single or a very 
small number of well regulated monopolistic firms, these concerns may not materialize, as we 
demonstrate using an historical example. 
For 200 years spanning almost the entire length of the colonial North American fur trade, 
the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) held a monopoly over most of what is now Canada, east of 
the continental divide (Rocky Mountains). The HBC aggressively self-policed the region they 
controlled to ensure that their full monopoly rights were upheld (Gough, 2007). As a 
consequence, the HBC was able to restrict the flow of beaver pelts out of North America. This 
had two important effects: First, the price of beaver pelts was much higher than it would 
otherwise be, leading to large profits for the HBC. Second, and perhaps more important in the 
current context, the population of beavers remained viable because of the conservation effect of 
restricted trade. 
The lands to the west of the North American continental divide were not controlled by 
any form of monopolistic company until 1824. In fact, during the late 18
th  and early 19
th 
centuries, many companies from Great Britain, the United States, Spain and Russia competed for   27 
furs along the northwest coast of North America. The prize of the fur trade in this region was the 
sea otter, and, as a consequence of an unrestricted competitive fur trade, the sea otter population 
plummeted rapidly from perhaps 300,000 to less than 2000. Even today, the sea otter remains an 
endangered species. 
The lesson to be learned is that the structure of the tiger farming sector could have a 
tremendous effect on the fate of the tiger. To the extent that China is the sole or primary market 
for tiger products and that tiger products are not in high demand in other countries, the granting 
of a monopoly charter would ensure that tiger products are sold at a price high enough to cover 
the costs of a captive breeding program while also providing monopoly rents. In this case, the 
granting of a monopoly charter could lead to greater anti-poaching enforcement and reduce the 
demand for poached products. 
It would be in the interest of a monopoly firm to take actions against poachers to protect 
their profits. A high monopolistic price can only be maintained if poaching is prevented and, as a 
consequence, the monopolist will be interested in preventing poaching. The monopoly charter 
should give the firm the right to police poachers, and possibly even provide additional incentives 
for them to do so. Given that the current detection rate is only some 3%, it is clear that extant 
methods of anti-poaching enforcement are ineffective, perhaps because government officials and 
police officers are susceptible to corruption. Those involved in anti-poaching activities are not 
impacted financially by the success of poachers, except to the extent that they can be bribed. A 
monopolist, on the other hand, would have great incentive to prevent poaching because poaching 
threatens monopoly rents. 
To help ensure that poached wild tigers are not ‘laundered’ into the stock of captive bred 
tigers, an animal registration program similar to that used for cattle in Europe and North America   28 
could be adopted. In the cattle sector, animals are registered with the government at birth, 
identified by ear tags, frequently branded, and so on. All captive bred tigers could similarly be 
registered at birth with the registration system monitored for compliance not only by the Chinese 
government but also by a credible international organization such as CITES that would certify 
products. Only animals born in captivity to registered parents could be culled to produce 
medicines and other goods, with monitoring again performed by an outside certifier. Such a 
scheme would address the three concerns raised by various wildlife protection groups. 
Monopolistic power, regulatory restrictions and monitoring are all required to give wild tigers 
their best chance of survival, although other policies (e.g., conservation payments) would need to 
address the problem of habitat loss and depletion of the tiger’s prey. 
Ethical and ideological considerations are important factors not taken into account in the 
forgoing analysis. Clearly, one can object to the slaughter of tigers or other wildlife, but it occurs 
despite our objections. One can also object on ethical grounds to the sale of products from tiger 
farms, except that it is difficult to argue against tiger farms while accepting the production of 
beef, poultry, pig and other commodities from what are best described as animal manufacturing 
facilities.
11
                                                 
11 For an excellent and even-handed discussion about animal welfare, hunting and large-scale 
animal production facilities, see Scully (2002). 
 Unfortunately, about all that we can conclude from our analysis is that, if wild tigers 
are to be preserved, we must adopt a pragmatic strategy that includes efforts to protect habitat, 
enforce bans on poaching and international trade, and enable countries to develop and implement 
institutions that reduce opportunities for illegal activities of all kinds. But we must also be 
prepared to adopt approaches that might be difficult to accept from an ethical and ideological 
perspective, and that could well include the sale of products from tiger farms in China (Rao, 
2008).    29 
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